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R&D Activities and Export Performance of Indian 
Private Firms 
1.  Introduction 
Since its first Industrial Policy Act in 1948 until the early 1980s, India’s restrictive trade, 
technology and industrial policies severely affected its industrial development and led to poor 
export performance, foreign exchange crises and to eventual dismantling of these restrictions in 
1991. India protected its industry from foreign competition by introducing high tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions on imports. India restricted its domestic competition by reserving a large 
number of goods for production by small scale firms and by limiting the capacity expansion of 
existing firms. To encourage indigenous technology production, India gave fiscal incentives for 
firms to do in-house R&D, and severely discouraged import of technology by setting very low 
limits on royalty payments to foreigners, and by imposing high tariff and other non-tariff barriers 
to import capital goods, and by virtually banning direct foreign investment.  The technology and 
industrial policies also created strong entry and exit barriers.  The world export market, however, 
consists of efficient firms drawn from all over the world.  To succeed in the world export market, 
a firm must continuously modernize its technology either by importing technology or doing in-
house R&D. Due to the above restrictive trade and technology policies, Indian firms gradually 
lost their comparative advantage; by 1980 India lost its market shares in the export markets for 
most manufacturing products.
1 
To correct these severe policy mistakes, the Indian government initiated limited import 
liberalization and export promotion policies in its 1980 Industrial Policy Statement. The main 
focus of these policies was to improve productivity growth and increase export earnings. Since 
                                                 
1 India also benefited from its inward looking trade and technology policies.  See Desai [1984] for an 
account of some of the positive and negative achievements that could be attributed to India’s technology 
policies. See Srinivasan [1996] for a critical appraisal of India’s trade and industrial policies.   
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the exporters had lost international competitiveness - being forced to use high-cost domestic 
inputs, they were granted the opportunity to import raw materials, machine components and 
capital goods on more liberal terms; limits on royalty payments of exporting firms were raised 
substantially upward, and sometimes they were also given cash benefits and duty exemptions on 
imports to make up for their use of high-cost domestic inputs. The exporting firms were allowed 
to import R&D related capital goods more easily and were given fiscal benefits to do in-house 
R&D.    
The literature is sparse on the models of firm level export incorporating imperfect market 
structures.   Most theoretical trade models of trade that incorporate imperfect competition assume 
that firms within an industry are homogeneous in terms of technology or cost function and the 
focus of the literature is to find conditions under which there is intra-industry trade and to study 
the welfare effects of trade policies, see Helpman and Krugman [1985]. The firm level empirical 
analyses of exports incorporating imperfect market structure are limited to developed country. 
For instance, Glejser, Jacquemin and Petit [1980] test the implications of imperfect market 
structure on export performance of Belgian firms, Wakelin [1998] studies the effect of firm R&D 
expenditures on export performance of British firms, and Sterlacchini [1999] studies the effect of 
non-R&D type of innovative activities on exports of small Italian manufacturing firms.   
The empirical literature on the firm level export behavior of less developed countries is 
even sparser. Among a few others, Roberts and Tybout [1997] and Clerides, Lach and Tybout 
[1998] carried out studies on Colombia, Mexico and Morocco. The firm level studies on Indian 
export include Kumar and Siddharthan [1994], Patibandala [1995] and Hassan and Raturi [2002].  
These studies mostly focus on the effect of firm size and R&D expenditures on export 
performance.  
Most empirical studies with the exceptions of Wakelin [1998] and Hassan and Raturi 
[2002] formulate export behavior as a Probit or Tobit model, and none of these studies examine 
the role of competitiveness on export behavior.   
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In this paper I analyze how R&D activities influence export performance of private firms 
when they operate in an imperfect market structure induced by above type of policies. I estimate 
the effect of competitiveness on a firm’s export decision. I first theoretically model the optimal 
export behavior of private firms operating in an imperfect market structure that resulted from 
Indian protective policies. I use this model to guide my econometric specifications. I argue that 
the Tobit model is not an appropriate model to analyze the effect of the export promotion and 
import liberalization policies. More specifically, the Tobit model assumes that any variable that 
increases the probability of positive export must also increase the average volume of export of the 
exporting firms.  Given the nature of Indian policies, it is possible that a firm may like to attain 
the exporting status by exporting some positive amount so that it can take advantage of the 
benefits given to exporters. After the above type of export promotion policies are introduced, a 
firm is more likely to enter the export market but it’s export volume is likely to be lower. 
Similarly the effect of R&D activities may differ for the probability of export and for the average 
volume of export of the exporting firms, given the type of incentives that were introduced for 
R&D activities of the exporting firms.  The Cragg model is more flexible than the Tobit model 
and it allows these possibilities.  In the paper, I carry out the likelihood ratio (LR) test and the 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test of the Cragg model against the Tobit model, and show that the 
Tobit model is rejected in all specifications.  I then point out some of the major differences in the 
policy evaluations that could be drawn from these two models. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I describe the theoretical 
model of optimal export decisions of private firms.  I examine the theoretical predictions of the 
model regarding the effects of firm size, productive efficiency, and domestic and foreign 
competition on exports decisions.  In section 3, I describe the panel data on a sample of 415 firms 
during the period 1975-1986 that I use in this study.  This 12 years period is also suitable for 
assessing the effect of the partial import liberalization and export promotion policies that India 
introduced in 1980. In section 4, I use the model of section 2 as guidance to formulate the  
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empirical specification of the Cragg model,  carry out two specification testing of the Tobit model 
against the Cragg model,  and point out the type of wrong policy conclusions that may be drawn 
if one uses the Tobit model instead of the Cragg model.  In section 5, I have my concluding 
remarks.  
 
2. A model of optimal export decision 
I present a model of optimal export decision of private firms operating in an imperfectly 
competitive market structure.  I use the model to examine how the volume of export is related to 
the type of domestic competition conditioned by various industrial policies, foreign competition 
conditioned by import tariffs, quotas, and non tariff barriers, and to technological backwardness 
fueled by the restrictive technology import policies.  These predictions are then used to formulate 
an econometric model of export for empirical analysis at the firm level.   
2.1 Market Structure 
Given the protective environment created by the trade, technology and industrial policies, 
the Indian firm acts as monopolists in the industry, each producing a product similar to others but 
differentiated by variety. Each firm takes the output levels and prices of other firms, the tariff 
rates and the volume of imports of similar goods as fixed and acts as a monopolist in the residual 
market.  The firm assumes that its actions in its own market do not influence other firms’ demand 
curves, and their actions.  Or in other words, each firm is very small relative to the total size of 
the industry, but in its own market it acts as a monopolist. Thus, the firm takes the export price 
net of transport cost pw as given and decides the volume of export, if it decides to export at all, 
and also decides the price  D p  and the quantity  D q  for the domestic market. All other firms in the 
industry act the same way, but they are heterogeneous with respect to their technology and firm  
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size.  More specifically, I assume a monopolistically competitive industrial structure.
2  
I assume that when the price is same, the consumers prefer a foreign variety over a 
domestic variety of a good.  So the domestic producers act in the residual market.  In this residual 
market, each producer may try to grab as much market share as possible by advertising and 
creating consumer confidence in their product.  I assume that these activities are either absent or 
all firms behave identically in this respect.
3   That means, all firms have identical inverse demand 
functions and the intercept and the slope of the identical inverse demand curve of firms depend on 
the strength of domestic competition and foreign competition that prevail in the industry.  The 
higher is the level of either type of competition, the lower are the intercept and the slope terms of 
the inverse demand curve.  I parameterize the level of competition that a firm encounters by θd 
and denote its inverse demand function by p(q; θd).  This inverse demand curve and the 
corresponding marginal revenue curve of a representative firm are shown in figure 1 as AR and 
MR respectively.   
 
2.1   Production Technology 
I represent the technology by cost function.  I assume that the average cost to produce a 
given level of output consists of a fixed cost, which depends on the installed capacity, and a 
variable cost, which is assumed to be increasing for output levels produced above the installed 
capacity.  This leads to a U-shaped average cost curve, shown in figure 1 as AC.  The output level 
at which the average cost is minimized depends on the installed capacity of the firm:  The higher 
the level of installed capacity, the higher is the output level q at which the average cost is 
                                                 
2 An alternative formulation would be the oligopolistic market structure in the domestic market.  There are, 
however, not enough empirical studies to ascertain which structure is relevant for Indian firms.  It is more 
likely that the monopolistic competition framework is more appropriate to model the industrial structure of 
lighter industries, and oligopolistic competition for heavier industries.  
3 This is a simplifying assumption for our empirical analysis, since I do not have information on such 
activities in my data set.   
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minimized.  Thus installed capacity can be characterized by the horizontal position of the tip of 
the average cost curve. 
The Indian firms were restricted from importing foreign technology in every possible 
way: they were restricted in purchasing blueprints from abroad due to limits on royalty payments 
to foreigners, and from importing capital goods with embodied foreign technology due to high 
tariff rates and other non-tariff barriers to such imports.  I assume that given their licensed 
capacities, the firms obtained their technologies from various sources at various times.  I also 
assume that the firms varied in their managements.  These led to differences in their cost curves. 
Given their licensed capacity, I represent the variations in cost curves across firms by a parameter 
θc and denote the cost functions by C(q; θc). The marginal cost curve and the average cost curve 
of a representative firm are shown in figure 1 as MC and AC respectively.  
Under the assumption that production function is homothetic, and technological change is 
factor neutral, the cost function can be represented by  () () ()() cwy w gy cc ,; θξγ θ =⋅⋅, where w 
is a vector of factor prices and ξ ,  γ and g are functions. I assume that the variations of 
technologies across firms are such that all firms have a common input aggregator function  () w ξ , 
but differ in productivity level  () c γ θ .  I also assume that factor prices are constant across firms 
and over time. It is then easy to see that  () γθ c  represents the growth factor of total factor 
productivity with respect to a reference firm in the base period for which  () γθ c  is normalized to 
1.  Thus for firms with a given level of capacity, the technological variations can be represented 
by  () γθ c  which can be indexed by the vertical position of the tip of the average cost curve. 
I further assume that the firms from the rest of the world that are active in the world 
export market are perfectly competitive and have achieved their long-run cost curve. Therefore, 
the world price pw is the same as the tip of the long-run average cost curves of these exporting 
firms in the world market.  Because of the limitations mentioned above, the unit cost of  
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production is higher in India as compared to the cost of its peers in the world economy.  In the 
following diagram this fact is reflected in having the tip of an Indian firm’s average cost curve at 
a higher level than the world price level.  I assume for now that all the distribution costs are 
included in the production cost, and that there is no extra cost associated with exporting.  I will 
come back to exporting cost later in this section.  
In sum, the three parameters that characterize the market structure of an industry in this 
set-up are 1) the slope and the intercept of the inverse demand curve, represented by the 
parameter  θd , 2) the vertical position of the tip of the average cost curve, represented by the 
parameter  θc  and 3) the installed capacity or the firm size which determines the horizontal 
position of the tip of the average cost curve in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Determination of exports at the firm level  
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2.3   Optimal firm behavior 
For profit maximization and assuming exporting of this product by any resident other 
than the monopolist is prohibitively costly or illegal, the optimal strategy of the monopolist is to 
quantity discriminate in the two markets – by controlling domestic supply qD , it sets a domestic 
price  pD  higher than the world price  pw and it acts as a price taker in the world market and 
exports the residual output, qq D − .  More formally, the profit maximization problem is given by  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) πθ θ θ θ dc q q Dd D w D c Max p q q p q q C q
D ,; ; , ≡⋅ + ⋅ − −      
where  () πθ θ dc ,  is the profit function of a firm parameterized by () θθ dc ,.   The first order 
conditions of the problem are 
  With respect to q,   () Cq p cw '; θ =       :     MC = world price level. 
  With respect to qD,   () () pq q p q p Dd D Dd w '; ; θθ +=    :     MR = world price level   
The above solution is obtained as follows: The firm produces output level q that equates 
marginal cost to the world price  pw, supplies output level qD  to the domestic market, which 
equates marginal revenue to the world price level  pw, and exports qq D − .   
It is clear from Figure 1 that export as a function of firm size will have the property that a 
firm will not export if its size is up to a critical level, qD .  Above this critical level qD , the firm 
will have higher export, the higher is its size (measured in terms of capacity to produce).  Thus, in 
this set-up, whether the firm size has any effect on export depends on whether capacity constraint 
of a firm implied by the Indian industrial licensing policy is below this critical firm size qD or not.  
It is clear from figure 1 that while for a given market condition θd  and assuming that the 
licensed capacity is set at a significantly high limit,  the critical level qD  that determines whether 
to export or not, does not depend on the productive efficiency level θc  of the firm; the volume of 
exports qq D − , however, depends positively on the productive efficiency level θc .  Furthermore,  
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notice that as the efficiency level θc  becomes lower, i.e., the tip of the AC curve moves to a 
higher level, the export amount (q – qD) becomes smaller. It is also clear that there exists a 
productive efficiency level below which the firms do not export, and above which the firms 
export positive amounts; furthermore, the volume of export is higher, the more productive a firm 
is. 
The degree of competitiveness of a firm can be measured by the Learner index, also 
known as the price-cost-margin,  () / D D PCM p MC p =− .  Notice that for a firm with demand 
elasticity e, PCM = -1/e.  In the extreme case of perfectly competitive market, 1/e = 0 and thus pD 
= MC, and PCM = 0.  Assuming cost curves are fixed, a higher competitiveness in the industry 
would then imply a lower PCM.  Keeping the cost curves fixed, what will be the effect of a 
higher competitiveness on exporting activities?  The effect is ambiguous because it is not clear 
how the inverse demand curve will shift because of higher competitiveness in the industry.   
Suppose a higher competitiveness shifts only the intercept term of the inverse demand curve to a 
lower level. Then, a higher competitiveness implies a higher likelihood of exports for firms which 
were not exporting before and a higher export volume for firms which were exporting before.  If a 
higher competition leads to a flatter inverse demand curve, then the effects will be just the 
opposite. When we have both types of shifts, the effect of competitiveness on likelihood and 
volume of exports depend on their relative magnitude of these two effects and need be 
determined empirically. 
What could be achieved in the long-run by introducing domestic competition with free 
entry and exit?  In this limiting case of monopolistic competitive equilibrium, the firms will have 
the marginal revenue curve tangent to the average cost curve as shown by the flatter marginal 
revenue curve MR* in figure 1. As the economy moves towards this equilibrium due to free entry 
and exit, the PCM of the firms will fall and exports will rise.   The PCM level corresponding to 
the monopolistic competition is the lowest level of PCM that can be attained only with domestic  
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competition. To attain any further competitiveness in the industry (in the limit to achieve the 
perfectly competitive equilibrium outcome), the industry must allow foreign competition by 
lowering the tariff rates.  So long as the tariff rate is positive, the model can explain intra industry 
trade.   
I have so far assumed that there are no extra costs or benefits associated with exporting 
activities.  Exporting may involve extra sunk costs.  For instance, a firm may have to invest in 
R&D to meet the product quality standard of the export market. In that case firms with R&D 
capabilities will have higher likelihood of exporting, see Roberts and Tybout [1997] for a model 
of optimal firm level export along this line.  One firm’s R&D may create product and process 
innovations for the exporting markets and other firms in the same industry can benefit from such 
knowledge without investing in R&D.  See Raut [1995] for evidence on R&D spillover in a 
different context.  In this paper, I assumed R&D to be an exogenous variable and assumed that it 
does not create any externality. Exporting activity of one firm may reduce the information and 
networking cost associated with exporting of other firms in the same geographical area and in the 
same market and from this point of view, the presence of multi national enterprise (MNE) in an 
industry of a particular geographical area may influence the export decisions of local firms in the 
industry, see Aitken, Hanson and Harrison [1997] for a model along this line.  While these effects 
are important, I have not pursed these aspects in this paper.   
 
3.  The Data Set 
Data on variables such as net sales, fixed assets, and wages and salaries were taken from 
various issues of Bombay Stock Exchange Directory. Data on exports and imports of capital 
goods and raw materials came from annual reports of the individual companies that are registered 
with the Ministry of Company Affairs. The nominal variables were converted into real terms by  
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using wholesale price index numbers, which came from Revised Numbers for Wholesale Price 
Indices, the Ministry of Industry, the Government of India. The firms in this study are taken to be 
those that were registered with the Bombay Stock Exchange Directory and the ministry of 
Company Affairs and had paid-up capital of at least 50 lakhs. There were about 2500 firms 
registered with the Ministry of Company Affairs, out of which only about 900 firms were 
registered with the Bombay Stock Exchange Directory. I had to further restrict the sample to 
firms having at least three consecutive years of data during the two periods to satisfy the data 
requirements for the econometric analysis, and I ended up with 415 firms in the sample. In this 
study, I define a firm to be exporting if it had some amount of exports during the period 1975-
1986. According to each firm's primary output, I assigned a 3-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification code taken from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) volumes published by CSO 
(Central Statistical Organization). Although it would be ideal to carry out an analysis at the 2-
digit industry level, due to paucity of data in certain industries, I regrouped the industries 
according to their technological complexities into two groups – light and heavy industries. The 
composition of each industry group and a few selected summary statistics of our variables are 
shown in table 1.  
It appears from table 1 that there are 145 firms in the light industry and 270 firms in the 
heavy industry.  About 32.48% firms in the light industry and 40.91% firms in the heavy industry 
are exporters.  It is also apparent that in both industries, the exporting firms import 
proportionately more raw materials and capital goods and invest more in in-house R&D than the 
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4. Econometric formulation and empirical findings 
From our model of optimal export decision it follows that the decisions to export and 
how much to export depend on the firm size, the cost factors represented by θc , the market 
demand conditions represented by  d θ  and the export promotion policies.  I take the logarithm of 
fixed capital as a measure of firm size. The cost parameter θc  and the demand condition  d θ  are  
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not directly observed. In-house R&D investment and import of capital goods are assumed to be 
the main determinants of θc .  It is often argued that barriers to import raw materials forced the 
Indian firms to use more expensive domestic raw materials, which increased the unit cost of 
production and hence adversely affected export. I also included this as another determinant of θc  
to see if this type of import barriers affected export decisions adversely. Notice that θd  depends 
on the tariff structure of the industries, the government policies mentioned earlier regarding entry 
and exit and policies related to monopoly restrictive trade practices (MRTP).  The detailed 
information about these variables is not available, so I take PCM as a summary measure of these 
factors. I follow the general convention of the empirical industrial organization literature to 
estimate PCM by, PCM = (total  sales – total wages and salaries – raw materials)/total sales.   I 
included a time dummy variable y_80s, defined as y_80s = 1 if year ≥ 1981, and y_80s = 0 
otherwise.  I included this dummy variable to see if after controlling for firm size,  technology θc , 
and market condition  d θ , the firms showed favorable export performance after the export 
promotion policies were introduced in 1980.   
 
4.1 Econometric Issues 
Previous studies on Indian firm level exports used a Tobit model.  As I mentioned in the 
introduction, given the type of export promotion policies that India introduced in 1980, some of 
the regressors in our model will have different impact on the likelihood of exporting and on the 
amount of exports.  For instance, since a firm is allowed to import raw materials, capital goods 
and R&D related capital more easily if it is an exporting firm, the firm would respond to such 
export promotion policies by exporting some amount but the amount would not be higher than the 
average amount that the firms were exporting before such policies were introduced. That means, 
the dummy variable y_80s will have a positive effect on the probability of exporting but a  
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negative or no effect on the average export amount of a representative exporting firm. Since the 
Tobit model restricts both these effects to be in the same direction, the Tobit model will give 
biased estimates of the parameters and may lead to wrong policy conclusions.  I will use the 
Cragg model which is more flexible than Tobit model and which nests Tobit model as a special 
case.  In the next subsection, I will show empirical evidence of how policy evaluations could be 
very different when we use the Tobit model instead of the Cragg model. 
  More specifically, let   it I  be an indicator variable taking value 1 if firm i in period t has 
positive export, and taking value 0 otherwise.  Let  it y  denote the volume of export, and  it X  
denote a row vector of k explanatory variables for firm i in period t.  The Cragg model assumes 
that the probability of a limit observation is driven by a Probit model 
{ } () 1 Pr 0| it it it yX X β == Φ −  with a column vector of parameters  1 β  of dimension k, where 
Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  The probability of a non-limit 
observation, i.e., the probability of exporting a positive amount  it y  follows a truncated normal 
distribution with mean  2 it X β  and variance 















, where φ  is the standard normal probability density function.  Notice that 
we have distinct parameter coefficients for the regressors in two models:  1 β  for the limit 
observation, and  2 β  for the non-limit observation.  Our data consists of observations of the type 
{ } ,, it it it I yX , where  it y  is the export level of the firm i in period t.  The likelihood of the sample 
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∏  
Notice that the Cragg model nests the Tobit model under the null hypothesis  01 2 :/ H ββ σ = .   
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Using the unrestricted and restricted maximized log-likelihoods of the sample I calculate the 
2 χ  
statistic for the likelihood ratio (LR) test to statistically test the above null hypothesis. This 
2 χ  
test statistic is distributed as chi-square with k degrees of freedom.  The Tobit estimates and this  
2 χ  test statistics for each industry group are shown in table 2.   
The log-likelihood function for Cragg model is not globally concave even when one re-
parameterizes the Cragg model using Olsen transformation.  Thus it may not always be possible 
to compute the maximized log-likelihood function for testing purpose.  For instance, when I used 
both firm size and square of firm size in my specifications, the numerical maximization of the 
log-likelihood did not converge under all the available algorithms in SAS.
4  Lin and Schmidt 
[1984] proposed a LM (Lagrange Multiplier) test criterion which uses only the maximized log-
likelihood of the Tobit model, but it is rather cumbersome to compute.  Green[1997, pp.970]  
proposed an alternative 
2 χ  test statistic for the null hypothesis which requires only the 
maximized log-likelihood of the sample under Tobit, Probit and truncated normal distributions.  
In table 2, I also report the parameter estimates from the Probit models and the Green version of  
2 χ  statistics to test the null hypothesis of Tobit model against the Cragg model.   In table 3, I 
present the parameter estimates from the Cragg model.  
 
4.2   The empirical findings  
Notice that both  
2 χ  tests reject the Tobit model against Cragg model for all our industry groups. 
Even though the Tobit model is rejected against the Cragg model, I present the parameter 
estimates from the Tobit model in table 2 so that we can compare the parameter estimates with a 
                                                 
4 The Tobit and Probit models, however, did not have this problem.  This is the reason why I did not 
include square of the firm size.  
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previous study by Kumar and Siddarthan [1994] who estimated a Tobit model of export, and to 
compare the differences in policy evaluations that may result from misspecification of the model.  
 
Table 2:  Parameter Estimates from the Probit and Tobit  Model of Export 
 
   Light Industry Heavy  Industry Overall  Industry 
Variables  Probit  Tobit  Probit   Tobit  Probit   Tobit 
Intercept -1.4496  -1.8098  -0.2781  -0.3428  -0.5690  -0.6441 
   (7.70)  (5.67)  (2.77)  (3.10)  (6.50)  (5.76) 
Dummy variable,   0.5767  0.6075  0.1570 -0.0358 0.3071  0.1340 
= 1 if 1980's  (5.94)  (3.88)  (2.55)  (0.54)  (6.04)  (2.13) 
Firm size 
0.0788 0.0230 -0.0531  -0.0580 -0.0244 -0.0445 
   (1.88)  (0.35)  (2.38)  (2.39)  (1.25)  (1.84) 
Import of capital 
goods 0.1191  0.3370  0.5333  0.0462  0.6767  0.0472 
   (0.31)  (0.60)  (3.40)  (13.80)  (4.61)  (12.36) 
Imports of raw  0.9244  0.7969 0.0010 0.0124 0.0015 0.0134 
Materials (6.24)  (4.93)  (0.47)  (7.36)  (0.65)  (6.93) 
Price-Cost-Margin 
-0.9352  -2.3695 0.0529 -0.0380 -0.1135 -0.4574 
   (3.09)  (4.84)  (0.31)  (0.21)  (0.85)  (2.79) 
R & D expenditures 
12.3835  13.9426  13.4343  1.0343  14.5197  1.2633 
   (2.41)  (2.63)  (6.13)  (3.11)  (6.95)  (3.35) 
σ 
 1.6730     1.1526 
 
1.3152 
      (20.16)     (34.14)     (39.57) 
Green version of 
2 χ    197.00   671.00   868.00 
2 χ  for standard LR test  281.72 773.55  978.61 
Note: The absolute value of t-statistic is within parentheses. The critical value for  
2
7 χ   at 5% is 




The parameter estimates from table 2 show that the R&D investment increased a firm’s 
likelihood to export and the propensity to export in all industries.  Assuming capital good 
represents embodied technology, it appears that the import of technology is not an important 
determinant of exports in the technologically light industry, but it is an important determinant in 
the technologically heavy industry. These two facts together imply that in the light industry the 
indigenously produced technology in the in-house R&D help exports. In the heavy industry, 
however, it appears that for exporting activities import of technology and in-house R&D to adopt 
the technology to local condition help exports.  This is broadly what was found by Kumar and 
Siddarthan.[1984] using firm level data from 1987-89 and using Tobit model.  This pattern on 
sources of technology of these two industries are consistent with the pattern found in Raut [1988]. 
From the estimate of the coefficient of import of raw materials it appears that the tariffs 
and non-tariff import barriers that Indian government imposed in the past did adversely hurt 
exports. Furthermore, from the parameter estimate of the dummy variable y_80s it appears that 
the partial liberalization policies of 1980 had encouraged firms to have higher likelihood of 
engaging in exporting activities in all industries and also increased the propensity to export in the 
light industry.  This effect is in addition to the effects through import of capital goods, raw 
materials and R&D activities that the partial liberalization policy of 1980 might have 
accomplished.  Firm size is not an important detriment to export activities in the light industry but 
it affected adversely both the likelihood and propensity of exporting for the firms in the heavy 
industry.   
Finally, it appears that competitiveness leads to higher likelihood of exports and higher 
propensity to export for firms only in the light industry.  This result also holds for the Cragg 
model.  This result is reasonable since in the light industry it is possible for firms to enter  and it 
is reasonable since it is possible for light industry is capable to Let us now turn to the parameter 
estimates from the more flexible Cragg model in table 3 and point out how some of the policy 





Table 3: Estimates from the Cragg Model of Export 
   Light Industry Heavy  Industry Overall  Industry 
Variables  Limit Non-limit Limit   Non-limit Limit Non-limit 
Intercept  -1.4497 1.3176 -0.2781 -3.7002 -0.5690 -3.9228 
   (7.70)  (0.20)  (2.77)  (5.25)  (6.50)  (4.47) 
Dummy variable,  
0.5770  -7.1679  0.1570  -9.2572  0.3071  -7.9391 
= 1 if 1980's  (5.94)  (2.58)  (2.55)  (25.70)  (6.04)  (15.80) 
Firm size 
0.0786 -1.6535 -0.0531 -0.0447 -0.0244 -0.4073 
   (1.88)  (1.15)  (2.38)  (1.19)  (1.25)  (3.91) 
Import of capital 
goods 0.1202  0.2140  0.5333  -0.0310  0.6767  -0.0388 
   (0.31)  (0.04)  (3.40)  (4.44)  (4.61)  (2.34) 
Imports of raw 
0.9239 -0.5896 0.0010  0.0187 0.0015 -1.5337 
Materials (6.23)  (0.30)  (0.47)  (5.97)  (0.65)  (20.93) 
Price-Cost-Margin 
-0.9336  -22.9917 0.0529  0.1732  -0.1135 -10.8956 
   (3.09)  (3.08)  (0.31)  (0.52)  (0.85)  (7.60) 
R & D expenditures 
13.0360 1.2459 13.4344 -0.4163 14.5240 2.2557 
   (2.45)  (0.02)  (6.14)  (0.99)  (6.95)  (1.06) 
 
The parameter estimates from the Cragg model in table 3 show that while the parameter 
estimates  1 β  for the limit observations in the Cragg model are very similar to the estimates of the  
1 β   in the Probit model, but the parameter estimates for the non-limit observations of the Cragg 
model are very different from the estimates from Tobit model.  For instance, notice that R&D 
expenditure cease to be a significant determinant of the propensity to export. Similarly, import of 
raw materials cease to be a significant determinant of export propensity in the light industry. Most 
striking difference between the Tobit and Cragg models are the coefficient estimates for import of  
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capital goods and y_80s.  The effect of import of capital goods on export propensity is  now 
significantly negative in the heavy industry while it was significantly positive in the Tobit model. 
The effect of y_80s on export propensity is now significantly negative in both industries while it 
was significantly positive or insignificant in the Tobit model.  The effect of PCM is the only 
effect that is conformable in both models. 
From the fact that y_80s and import of capital goods have positive effect on  the 
probability of exporting but negative effect on the propensity to export lead to an important 
policy judgment: the partial liberalization and export promotion policy of 1980 created  a peculiar 
export incentives of the type that while the firms were more likely to export some positive 
amount to qualify as exporter so that they could import capital goods, raw materials, and 
technology more easily,  the export propensity of these firms were lower on the average than the 
export propensity of the original exporters.  Thus the export promotion and partial liberalization 
policies encouraged more firms to become exporters while dropping the average export 
propensity.  This inference about the effect of liberalization and export promotion policies is 
qualitatively different from the inference based on estimates from the Tobit model. The other 
significant difference in inference is in the effect of R&D expenditure on export propensity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper I have examined how competitiveness and cost effectiveness influenced exporting 
activities of Indian private firms during 1975-1985. I considered a theoretical model of optimal 
export decision within an imperfectly competitive industrial structure and used it for guiding the 
econometric analysis.  I considered three factors that influenced cost effectiveness of Indian 
firms: in-house R&D expenditures, import of technology embedded in capital goods, and import 
of raw materials.  I carried this analysis separately for technologically light and technologically  
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heavy industries. I also empirically evaluated if the partial liberalization and export promotion 
policies that were introduced in 1980 had significant positive effects on exporting activities of 
firms.  
  I have argued that commonly used Tobit model is not appropriate for modeling export 
activities and it may lead to incorrect policy evaluations:  It is more appropriate to use Cragg 
model.  I carried out specification testing of the Tobit model against the Cragg model, and found 
that the Tobit model was rejected for all specifications.   
According to the Cragg model, the export promotion and partial liberalization policies 
that were introduced in 1980 encouraged firms to become exporter so that they could qualify to 
import capital goods, raw materials and technology more easily.  These policies, however, 
lowered the average propensity to export.  Furthermore, in-house R&D had positive effect on 
probability of exporting, but not on the propensity to export.  The import of embedded technology 
increased the probability of exporting but had negative effect on propensity to export.  The Tobit 
model in this study as well as the study by Kumar and Siddarthan [1994], on the other hand, gave 
a misleading inference by estimating positive effects of R&D and import technology on 
propensity to export.  The only qualitatively robust inference across these two models is that 
higher competitiveness led to higher likelihood and propensity to export in the light industry.  The 
findings of this paper also warn us to be cautious while using the Tobit estimates to judge the 
performance of export promotion and liberalization policies without carrying out a specification 
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